

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 075735

P R 060555Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3227

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 1301

EXDIS

CINCPAC PASS POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HELMS' VISIT TO PAKISTAN

1. I AM CERTAIN THAT I AM NOT CAPABLE OF
GETTING INTO MESSAGE FORM ALL MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE THAT
HAPPENED IN THE JUST CONCLUDED HELMS VISIT HERE. HIS
TALKS WITH BHUTTO AND AZIZ AHMED TOTALLED NEARLY SEVEN
HOURS, SOME OF WHICH WAS AT DINNER TABLE. IF MY
REPORTING CANNOT REFLECT ALL OF THIS, LET ME JUST SAY AT
THE BEGINNING THAT THE TALKS WENT EXTREMELY WELL AND WERE,
I BELIEVE, OF CONSIDERABLE MUTUAL BENEFIT. THE
PAKISTANIS WENT ALL OUT FOR HELMS EVEN THOUGH HE WAS
HERE IN THE MOST SOLEMN PART OF RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY
PERIOD. EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED ON ONE SUB-
STATIVE MATTER (TO BE EXPLAINED LATER) THEY WERE WELL
PLEASED AT OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HELMS UNDERSTAND THEIR VIEW-
POINT. IT IS A MOSLEM TRAIT TO WANT OTHERS OF IMPORTANCE
TO "KNOW HOW THEY FEEL" AND THEY MADE THE MOST OF IT.
HELMS WAS STRAIGHT-FORWARD AND OPEN WITH THEM WHICH THEY

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ALSO FRANKLY ADMIRE.

2. AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, THE OIL AVAILABILITY AND PRICE CRISES WERE THE FIRST THINGS THAT CAME UP WHEN HELMS AND I MET WITH BHUTTO ALONE SOME ONE AND A HALF HOURS PRIOR TO DINNER ON SUNDAY EVENING. BHUTTO ASKED WHAT DEALS OTHERS WERE MAKING WITH IRAN ON OIL. HELMS SAID THAT APPARENTLY THE BRITISH HAD MADE AN AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE SCARCE RAW MATERIALS IN EXCHANGE FOR OIL. THIS OIL WOULD BECOME AVAILABLE ONLY IN THE LATTER HALF OF 1974 AND FOR SOME PART OF 1975. HE SAID THAT AS A MATTER OF FACT IRAN DID NOT HAVE ANY UNALLOCATED OIL IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1974. THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE DEAL WITH THE BRITISH IS RELATIVELY SHORT TERM. HELMS SAID HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY SURE WHAT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT WITH THE GERMANS. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME TALK ABOUT ACQUIRING THE ENGINES FROM THE LEOPARD TANK BUT THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY SPECIFIC PURCHASES HAD BEEN MADE. HE KNEW THAT THE SHAH BELIEVED THAT THE ENGINE IN THE LEOPARD TANK WAS THE BEST ON THE MARKET AND CONSIDERED TO BE SUPERIOR TO THAT IN THE CHIEFTON TANK OF WHICH IRAN HAS ALREADY PURCHASED.

3. BHUTTO ASKED IN WHAT GENERAL STATE OF MIND THE SHAH WAS IN. HELMS SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN HIM FOR SOME WEEKS DUE TO HIS ABSENCE BUT WENT AHEAD AND TALKED ABOUT THE SHAH'S PHILOSOPHY, ABOUT THE OPEC MEETING OF DECEMBER 22-23 AND WHAT COUNTRIES APPEARED TO BE MODERATES ON THE PRICE ISSUES AND WHICH ONES EXTREME. BHUTTO SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE PRODUCERS WERE MINDFUL ENOUGH OF THE REAL CRISIS THEY WERE CAUSING IN THE WORLD AND PARTICULARLY IN THE LDC'S. IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT TO DO. HE SAID THEY COULD SPEAK BILATERALLY AND HEAR A LOT OF SWEET TALK BUT RESULTS DID NOT FOLLOW. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE OR OTHERS SHOULD TRY TO RAISE THE MATTER TO A MULTILATERAL BASIS THIS WOULD OF COURSE CAUSE IRRITATION. HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD AT THE LAHORE CONFERENCE AND HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO THIS EFFECT TO PRESIDENT NIXON. ABU DHABI WAS URGING THAT PAKISTAN TAKE INITIATIVE AS THEY WERE CLOSE TO THE ARABS, THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. THE MATTER CERTAINLY WOULD BOIL OVER SOMEWHERE BEFORE
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TOO LONG AS THE THIRD WORLD SEEMED BUILDING UP TO AN EXPLOSION OVER WHAT THE NEW OIL PRICES WERE DOING TO THEIR ECONOMIES AND TO THEIR PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT.

4. HELMS SAID THAT EVERYTHING HAD BEEN HAPPENING SO FAST THAT EVEN POLICIES OF THE IRANIANS SEEMED TO BE SHIFTING ALMOST BEFORE ONE'S EYES. THEY SEEMED TO BE SCUTTLEING PROJECTS AND JOINT VENTURES WHICH THEY HAD BEEN ALL FOR

EVEN A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO. THE POLICY DIRECTION NOW IS DEVOTED TO AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT FINANCING WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO DEDICATE A MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF OIL AND GAS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROCHEMICALS WHICH OBVIOUSLY EARN FAR GREATER REVENUES.

5. BHUTTO SAID THE HEIKEL ARTICLE ABOUT US HAVING PLANS TO TAKE OVER ABU DHABI MILITARILY WORRIED HIM. HELMS ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NOTHING TO THIS WHATSOEVER. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS SURE OF THAT, BUT IT PUT HIM IN AN AWKWARD SPOT AS PAKISTAN IS LOOKED UPON AS AN ALLY OF AMERICA IN THAT AREA. HE SAID PAKISTAN'S POSITION THERE WAS STRONG AND HE DID NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED BY THE UNINFORMED OF BEING OUR CHOSEN INSTRUMENT IN THAT AREA - OR INVOLVED WITH US IN SUCH WILD IDEAS.

6. THE CONVERSATION TURNED TOWARDS PAKISTAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS. BHUTTO SAID REPEATEDLY THAT GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR PAKISTAN, AND THAT MEANT RELATIONS IN DEPTH. HE WISHED THE IRANIANS COULD REALLY BE CONVINCED OF THAT, AND NOT OVERREACT TO THE EXTENT THEY DO OVER MINOR MATTERS. THE NAME OF THE PERSIAN GULF HAD ONCE BEEN AN IRRITANT, HE THOUGHT UNNECESSARILY SO, AND HE HOPED HE HAD SET IT RIGHT BY CALLING IT BY THAT NAME IN HIS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ALSO HE FELT THERE WAS MISUNDERSTANDING ON SOME LEVELS IN IRAN AS TO WHAT HE IS UP TO IN BALUCHISTAN. BHUTTO SAID THAT WHILE HE HAS MILITARY THERE HE IS TRYING TO DO ALL POSSIBLE IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. HELMS POINTED OUT THAT IRAN HAD SOME MILITARY IN THEIR AREA AND IN SPITE OF A LOT OF TALK HAD DONE VIRTUALLY NOTHING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNTIL ABOUT A YEAR AGO WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO BUILD A BASE IN CHAH BAHAR. HE INDICATED
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THAT ROADS WERE NOW BEING BUILT AND EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS IN THIS BACKWARD AREA.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 1301

EXDIS

CINCPAC PASS POLAD

7. GETTING BACK TO SENSITIVITIES, BHUTTO SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WERE THOSE IN TEHRAN WHO FELT THAT IMPROVED IRAN-INDIAN RELATIONS WOULD BE FROWNED ON HERE. HE WANTED HELMS TO KNOW THIS WAS NONSENSE. HE SAID PAKISTAN WOULD WELCOME GOOD IRAN-INDIA RELATIONS, JUST AS HE HOPED OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH INDIA WOULD IMPROVE. (HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT TALK TOO MUCH TO THEM ABOUT WHAT WE THINK INDIAN INTENTIONS ARE, SAYING THAT THE PAKS OF COURSE KNEW THEM VERY WELL AND COULD MAKE UP THEIR OWN MIND IN VIEW OF THAT ACQUAINTANCE.) TURNING AGAIN TO IRAN, HE SAID THAT IF PAKISTAN MADE ANY APPROACHES AT ALL TO IRAQ, THERE WAS IRRITATION IN TEHRAN. HE SAID THAT DUE TO THIS SENSITIVITY HE ALWAYS CONSULTED IRAN BEFORE CONTACTS WITH ARAB STATES. HE SAID HE IS GOING VERY FAR WITH THE IRANIANS. A BBC MAN HAD ASKED TO COME TO LAHORE FOR THE COMING CONFERENCE. AS THIS MAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXPELLED FROM IRAN, BHUTTO HAD EVEN ASKED IF THEY OBJECTED TO HIS PRESENCE AT LAHORE. HE ASKED HELMS TO AGAIN TRY TO CONVINCE IRANIANS OF THE DEPTH OF HIS SINCERITY IN WANTING TO BE REALLY GOOD FRIENDS

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WITH IRAN.

8. BHUTTO SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT WHEN THE SHAH WAS ABSENT FROM IRAN. HE THOUGHT THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED WAS TO SEE THE SHAH PERSONALLY AND REGULARLY, AND HE HOPES TO DO THIS. HE SAID THERE WERE SO MANY GROUPS THAT WORK AGAINST EACH OTHER IN TEHRAN AND SOMETIMES COMPETE WITH

EACH OTHER IN TRYING TO UNDO THINGS THAT THE SHAH HAD ALREADY AGREED TO. SOMETIMES HE SAID, THIS WAS ON ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE BY THE SHAH ON THINGS BENEFICIAL TO PAKISTAN. HELMS URGED THAT BHUTTO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE SHAH WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND HOPED THEY COULD SEE EACH OTHER OFTEN. HE SAID THE PERSIANS HAD A PARTICULARLY PERSIAN WAY OF DOING THINGS, WHICH OFTEN TOOK TIME. IF HE SEEKS AID FROM IRAN IN ANY FORM, HIS OWN ADVICE WOULD BE TO JUST KEEP PLUGGING AWAY AT IT WITH AS MUCH PATIENCE AS POSSIBLE.

9. RETURNING TO BALUCHISTAN, BHUTTO SAID IT WAS A PITY THAT PAKISTAN AND IRAN HAD NOT STARTED JOINT VENTURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT AREA A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO. HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD WORK TOGETHER THERE WITHOUT SUSPICION TO TAKE THESE AREAS OUT OF THEIR FEUDAL STATE. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO LET HELMS AND ME IN ON A SECRET, WHICH WAS THAT IN THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY HE WAS GOING TO TAKE PUBLIC MOVES TO ABOLISH THE "SADAR" SYSTEM THERE, AS THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. HE SAID THE SADARS WOULD OF COURSE NOT READILY ACCEPT THIS, BUT IN TIME PEOPLE WILL BEGIN TO QUESTION THEIR LEGAL BASIS FOR AUTHORITY.

10. BHUTTO AND HELMS AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME STEP-UP IN SOVIET SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. HELMS SAID THAT THIS WAS THE MISSION OF THE UNDERCOVER TYPES IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO KEEP WORKING AWAY TO EXPLOIT SITUATIONS OR UNDERMINE GOVERNMENTS DESPITE WHATEVER PUBLIC POSTURE OR ASSURANCES THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS ESPOUSING AT THE TIME. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS WORKED ON TWO SEPARATE LEVELS AND THAT THIS WAS A STANDARD PART OF THEIR MODUS OPERANDI. THIS LEAD INTO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, WITH
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BHUTTO SAYING HE FELT THEY WERE BETTER OFF WITH DAUD THAN WHAT MIGHT REMAIN IF DAUD WERE REMOVED. HE EXPLAINED WHY HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO MOVE TROOPS CLOSER TO THE DURAND LINE EVEN THOUGH SOME OF HIS OWN MOSLEM OFFICERS FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND. HE WANTED TO DEVELOP THE FRONTIER AREAS OF THE PROVINCES AND STOP AS MUCH AS HE COULD ACROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS THAT CAUSED TROUBLE. HE SAID NEITHER WE NOR IRAN NEED FEAR THAT HE HAS ANY ILL DESIGNS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. HE DOES, HOWEVER, WANT TO BE PREPARED, SINCE IN MODERN HISTORY CEASE FIRE LINES ARE ALWAYS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNPREPARED AND THEY HAVE A WAY OF BECOMING NEW BORDERS FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME.

11. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE

EAST SITUATION BOTH IN PRIVATE AND AT DINNER. BHUTTO SEEMED PARTICULARLY SURPRISED AT HELMS' ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE MILITARY EQUATION BETWEEN ISRAELI AND ARAB FORCES WAS AT THE TIME ISRAEL STOPPED ITS ADVANCES TOWARDS CAIRO AND DAMASCUS. HE SAID THAT AFTER THEY GOT ORGANIZED FOLLOWING THE INITIAL ATTACK, THE ISRAELIS CLEARLY HAD THE CAPABILITY TO KEEP ON MOVING FORWARD, BUT THE BROADER RISKS WERE VERY GREAT, AND THEY DARED NOT MISCALCULATE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THEY FELT IF THEY WENT TOO FAR TOWARDS THESE ARAB CAPITALS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD MOVE IN IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER TO PREVENT THE CAPITALS FROM FALLING. THEY HAD ALSO TO WONDER HOW FAR THEY COULD GO WITHOUT LOSING SUPPORT OF THE U.S. THIS IS A NEW LINE OF THOUGHT HERE AS IT IS COMMONLY FELT THAT A MILITARY STALEMATE HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN EQUALS, AND THIS THOUGHT MAY CAUSE BHUTTO TO SEE THINGS IN A LITTLE DIFFERENT LIGHT. (HELMS TOLD ME LATER ON THAT HE THOUGHT BHUTTO WOULD GET THE SAME TYPE OF INFORMATION FROM SOME OF THE ARAB LEADERS WHO WOULD BE AT LAHORE, CERTAINLY KING HUSAYN AND THE SHAH IF HE ATTENDS.)

12. BHUTTO TOLD US HOW PLEASED HE WAS WITH THE NIXON STATEMENT WHEN THEIR NEW AMBASSADOR PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS. HELMS SAID IT LOOKED INDEED THAT SOME EXTRA EFFORT HAD GONE INTO THIS AND THIS SHOWED THE PRESIDENT'S OWN FEELINGS. I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT NORMAL FOR THIS TYPE OF STATEMENT TO GET PRESS ATTENTION.

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13. IT WAS CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE DISCUSSIONS THAT AZIZ AHMED WAS TO DISCUSS THE BIG PROBLEM, I.E., MILITARY SUPPLY, WITH US THE NEXT MORNING.

14. WHEN WE JOINED THE LADIES FOR DINNER, AZIZ AHMED AND SHAHI ALSO WERE PRESENT. IT WAS DELIGHTFUL, WITH BHUTTO IN RARE FORM AFTER HIS FIRST DAY OF REST IN AT LEAST FOUR WEEKS.
BYROADE

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